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Examining the interaction of mathematical abilities and mathematical 
memory: A study of problem-solving activity of high-achieving Swedish 
upper secondary students 
Attila Szabo1, Paul Andrews 
Stockholm University 
In this paper we investigate the abilities that six high-achieving Swedish upper secondary 
students demonstrate when solving challenging, non-routine mathematical problems. Data, 
which were derived from clinical interviews, were analysed against an adaptation of the 
framework developed by the Soviet psychologist Vadim Krutetskii (1976). Analyses showed 
that when solving problems students pass through three phases, here called orientation, 
processing and checking, during which students exhibited particular forms of ability. In 
particular, the mathematical memory was principally observed in the orientation phase, 
playing a crucial role in the ways in which students’ selected their problem-solving methods; 
where these methods failed to lead to the desired outcome students were unable to modify 
them. Furthermore, the ability to generalise, a key component of Krutetskii’s framework, was 
absent throughout students’ attempts. These findings indicate a lack of flexibility likely to be 
a consequence of their experiences as learners of mathematics. 
Key words: mathematical ability; non-routine problem solving; Krutetskii; mathematical 
memory; abstraction; generalization; high achieving students; Swedish upper secondary 
INTRODUCTION 
Typically based on arguments rooted in equity and social justice, much research has focused 
on the education of low-achieving mathematics students (e.g., Swanson & Jerman, 2006). 
However, with respect to framing this paper, relatively little attention has been focused on 
high-achieving students (Leikin, 2014). In this respect, a few studies have addressed the 
mathematical abilities invoked during problem-solving (Brandl, 2011; Vilkomir & 
O´Donoghue, 2009) but even fewer have considered the connection between students’ 
memory functions and their mathematical performance (Leikin, Paz-Baruch, & Leikin, 2013; 
Raghubar, Barnes, & Hecht, 2010). Indeed, no study since Krutetskii (1976) has examined 
the role of the mathematical memory in the context of able students’ problem-solving 
activities. 
BACKGROUND 
Krutetskii’s (1976) mathematical abilities 
Understanding students’ mathematical abilities has engaged researchers for more than a 
century. For example, more than one hundred and twenty years ago, Calkins (1894) 
concluded, with respect to Harvard students, that mathematicians have concrete rather than 
verbal memories, that there are no differences in ease in memorisation between 
mathematicians and other students and that, when doing mathematics, there is no significant 
difference between men and women (Calkins, 1894). Between that time and Krutetskii’s 
(1976) study, psychometric approaches presented mathematical abilities as not only innate 
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but fixed, viewpoints that are now not only rejected but which have created a research context 
in which words like ability have been construed negatively (Adey, Csapó, Demetriou, 
Hautamäki, & Shayer, 2007), an issue we aim to redress.  
As indicated above, a major contribution to our understanding of mathematical abilities 
emerged from the Soviet psychologist Krutetskii’s (1976) longitudinal study of around 200 
pupils of differing mathematical achievement levels. His analyses of their problem-solving 
activities led him to construe mathematical ability as a complex phenomenon comprising four 
components: 
1) The ability to obtain mathematical information (i.e. formalized perception of 
mathematical material), 
2) The ability to process mathematical information (i.e. logical thought, rapid and broad 
generalization of mathematical objects, relations and operations, the ability to curtail 
the process of mathematical reasoning, flexibility in mental processes, striving for 
clarity and simplicity of solutions), 
3) Retaining mathematical information (i.e. mathematical memory, which is a 
generalized memory for mathematical relationships, type characteristics, schemes of 
arguments and proofs and methods of problem-solving) and 
4) A general synthetic component, described as a “mathematical cast of mind”.  
(Krutetskii, 1976, pp. 350–351) 
For Krutetskii, all students have the propensity to develop these abilities through an 
engagement with appropriate mathematical activities, although “the specific content of the 
structure of abilities largely depends on teaching methods, since it is formed during 
instruction” (Krutetskii, 1976, p. 351). This latter point is particularly important in respect of 
the distinction between high-achieving and gifted students. For example, while Krutetskii 
construes mathematical giftedness as an “aggregate of mathematical abilities that opens up 
for successful performance in mathematical activity” (ibid, p. 77), he does not distinguish 
between high-achieving and gifted students, because, as is now widely accepted, many of the 
qualities of those who might once have been described as mathematically gifted can be taught 
(Leikin, 2014; Øystein, 2011; Usiskin, 2000). Finally, considering that Krutetskii's data were 
obtained in the 1960s it is natural to ask, five decades on, whether his framework retains its 
currency. In this respect, we note that researchers have worked with, and continued to 
develop, his framework throughout this period, as manifested in the work, presented 
chronologically to emphasise its temporal spread, of Wagner and Zimmermann (1986), 
Schoenfeld (1992), Garofalo (1993), Sheffield (2003), Sriraman (2003), Heinze (2005), 
Vilkomir and O´Donoghue (2009), Deal and Wismer (2010), Leikin (2010), Juter and 
Sriraman (2011). 
Krutetskii and memory in mathematics 
It is generally accepted that while memory plays a key role in all aspects of mathematical 
activity (Leikin et al., 2013; Raghubar et al., 2010), the “crucial question is not whether 
memory plays a role in understanding mathematics but what it is that is remembered and how 
it is remembered by those who understand it” (Byers & Erlwanger, 1985, p. 261). In this 
respect, Krutetskii (1976) argues that mathematical memory, which has a higher function 
than the recollection of multiplication tables or algorithms, concerns mathematical 
relationships, schemes of arguments, proofs and methods of problem-solving (ibid, p. 300). 
Additionally, mathematical memory, like all other mathematical abilities, develops within 
mathematical activities and, with respect to the able student, is selective and  




“retains not all of the mathematical information that enters it, but primarily that which 
is ‘refined’ of concrete data and which represents generalized and curtailed structures. 
This is the most convenient and economical method of retaining mathematical 
information” (Krutetskii, 1976, p. 300). 
Thus, able students retain the contextual information of a problem only during the problem-
solving process and, even several months later, can recall the general method they used when 
solving it (Krutetskii, 1976). Such competence is rarely observed in young children, for 
whom “the relevant and the irrelevant, the necessary and the unnecessary are retained side by 
side in their memories” (ibid, p. 339). Thus, it is not surprising that mathematical memory, at 
least as construed by Krutetskii, is easier to observe in mathematically able or older students 
than in young or low achieving students. 
Mathematical memory according to cognitive theories and neuroscience 
According to cognitive neuroscientists, a major function of the human brain is to relate all 
new information to previous knowledge and experience (Buckner & Wheeler, 2001; Ingvar, 
2009; Shipp, 2007). This process relies on the distinctive processes of different parts of the 
human memory system (Davis, Hill, & Smith, 2000; Olson et al., 2009; Squire, 2004), which, 
drawing on various sources (e.g. Moscovitch, 1992; Nyberg & Bäckman, 2009; Squire, 
2004), can be summarised as in Figure 1.  
The system shown in Figure 1 is largely categorized by the length of time information 
remains in the different partitions and the most fundamental distinction is between short-term 
and long-term memory, with the function of the former primarily given to working memory. 
In the working memory takes place a continuous and cyclical process, that includes 
mathematical problem-solving, focused on discovering new information or, if needed, 
updating and reforming existing knowledge.  
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Long-term memory has two subcategories, depending on the nature of the information stored. 
The implicit memory stores information about procedures, algorithms and patterns of 
movement that can be activated when certain events occur (Squire, 2004). It manages 
information on how something is done rather than why and is an automated and unconscious 
response to particular stimuli. Conversely, explicit memory stores information about 
experiences and facts which can be consciously recalled and explained (e.g. Davis et al., 
2000; Gärdenfors, 2010).  
Thus, with respect to the learning of mathematics and mathematical problem solving, implicit 
memory manages the procedures and algorithms that are, by means of automaticity, 
transferred to working memory during the problem-solving process. The development of 
automaticity, which is an effective but inflexible process that does not interfere with other 
functions of the working memory, is one of the main goals of the cognitive system (Ingvar, 
2009). The overtly conscious role of explicit memory is associated with the ability to create 
and use mental schemas for problem-solving. Thus, the solving of mathematical problems 
takes place in working memory and supported by the automatic recall of routine knowledge 
held in implicit memory and the conscious recall of problem-solving strategies held in 
explicit memory. 
In the above context, it is important to note that Krutetskii’s (1976) definition of 
mathematical memory excludes the recollection of numbers, algorithms and table skills, 
which, from a perspective of cognitive neuroscience, are automated processes. Consequently, 
it is not unreasonable to construe mathematical memory – the generalized mathematical 
methods and relationships altogether with mental schemes for problem-solving – as part of 
explicit memory. This conjecture is supported by evidence that mathematically able pupils 
are capable of explaining their use of generalized methods during problem-solving (Davis et 
al., 2000; Krutetskii, 1976).  
Finally, recent studies have identified an interaction between working memory, general 
giftedness and high achievement in mathematics (Leikin et al., 2013). In particular, a review 
of developmental and cognitive perspectives on the relationship between working memory 
and mathematics suggests that some memory processes facilitate learning and that particular 
aspects of working memory performances are specific to early mathematical learning 
(Raghubar et al., 2010). 
Problem solving in mathematics 
Finally, as our interest is in the relationship between students’ mathematical abilities and 
mathematical memory, as defined by Krutetskii (1976), as they solve mathematical problems 
it is important that both mathematical problem and problem solving are appropriately 
defined. 
With respect to mathematical problems, it is generally accepted that a mathematical problem 
offers an objective with no immediately obvious means of achievement (Pólya, 1957; 
Nunokawa, 2005), implying that problem complexity is a function of the problem solver's 
knowledge, experience and dispositions and not the task itself (Schoenfeld, 1985; Carlson & 
Bloom, 2005). Thus, as Krutetskii (1976) acknowledges, a familiar task, by dint of that 
familiarity, is not a problem. The presentation of a problem can vary, although typically it 
takes one of two forms; it can be located solely within mathematics itself or situated in some 
representation of the real world (Blum & Niss, 1991; Haylock & Cockburn, 2008). The latter 
problems are typically set in text and represent a common context within both school 
mathematics and international assessments like PISA. However, despite being construed 
similarly throughout the mathematics education literature, they have been prone to variation 




in their curricular form and function. For example, they have been used with one-step 
problems to encourage students’ recognition of linguistic structures in the development of 
solution strategies for solving analogous problems (Bassok, 2001; Philippou & Christou, 
1999). More authentically, they have been used to introduce new mathematical content by 
presenting students with problems for which they have no strategies beyond trial and 
improvement (Andrews & Sayers, 2012). Finally, in accordance with curricular aims 
internationally, they have been used to encourage the development of students’ problem-
solving competence (Andrews & Xenofontos, 2015; Brehmer, Ryve, & Van Steenbrugge, 
2015; Palm, 2008). This latter form of word problem, the form we deploy in this paper, is not 
straightforward as it requires not only the linguistic competence to decode the text but also 
the ability to extract relevant data, select and implement appropriate operations before 
interpreting the outcomes against the original context (Nesher, Hershkovitz, & Novotna, 
2003; Jitendra, Griffin, Deatline-Buchman, & Sczesniak, 2007; Vilenius-Tuohimaa, Aunola, 
& Nurmi, 2008). However, such problems have not always had the desired effect, with 
students often suspending any sense-making in their desire to answer even nonsensical 
problems (Greer, Verschaffel, Van Dooren, & Mukhopadhyay, 2009). 
Problem solving “is an activity requiring the individual to engage in a variety of cognitive 
actions, each of which requires some knowledge and skill, and some of which are not 
routine” (Cai & Lester, 2005, p. 221). Various frameworks have been proposed for analysing 
and describing the components of such activity, the best known of these, focused on 
supporting the teaching of problem-solving skills, is  Pólya’s (1957) understand the problem, 
devise a plan, implement the plan, and reflect, a process that is still found to encourage the 
development of problem-solving competence (Hensberry & Jacobbe, 2012). Subsequent 
problem-solving frameworks have typically been refinements of Pólya’s work; such as 
Mason, Burton and Stacey’s (1982) three-phase, Kapa’s (2001) six-phase or Nunokawa’s 
(2005) three-phase models. Others, such as the four component – orientation, organisation, 
execution and verification – model proposed by Garofalo and Lester (1985), have been 
explicitly meta-cognitive in their descriptions of the problem-solving process, as has Singer 
and Voica’s (2013) four phase process in which one decodes the problem, represents the 
problem in appropriate mathematical forms, processes what one already knows to test the 
model currently under scrutiny and, finally, implements a solution strategy. Such frameworks 
not only show much similarity but are also sufficiently general to accommodate the 
distinction between mathematical and application problems (Haylock & Cockburn, 2008). 
THE STUDY 
As indicated above, the aim of this study was to investigate the interaction of students’ 
mathematical abilities and mathematical memory, as defined by Krutetskii (1976), as they 
solved mathematical problems. Such aims are not straightforwardly realised because 
problem-solving tasks are expected to uncover the mathematical competences necessary for 
solving them rather than the recall of previously solved problems. In other words, tasks need 
to minimise the impact of analogical reasoning invoked by what Nogueira de Lima and Tall 
(2008) have described as ‘met-befores’. Moreover, good problems should be challenging, 
attainable and allow for different solution strategies (Hiebert et al., 2003; Roberts & Tayeh, 
2007). 
The tasks 
To accommodate different learner preferences with respect to problem types (Juter & 
Sriraman, 2011; Krutetskii, 1976), two mathematical problems, one geometric and one 
algebraic, were devised. Both problems, shown below, underwent substantial a-priori testing 
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with a group, different from the experimental group discussed below, of high-achieving 
students, which confirmed their suitability for the study.  
Problem 1: In a semicircle, as shown in Figure 2, are drawn two additional semicircles. Is the 
perimeter of the large semicircle longer, shorter or equal to the sum of the perimeters of the 





Figure 2: The diagram associated with Problem 1 
Problem 2: Mary and Peter want to buy a CD. At the store they realise that Mary has 24 SEK 
less and Peter has 2 SEK less than the price of the CD. Even when they put their money 
together they would not be able to afford the CD. What is the cost of the CD and how much 
money has each person? 
Participants     
The participants were students, aged 16–17 years, in the first year of post-compulsory school 
in Sweden. They were following an advanced mathematics programme, admission to which 
was based on their performance on a mathematical entrance examination, which situated 
them among the top 5% of students nationally. They were considered to be high-achieving in 
that all had participated in an acceleration programme while in compulsory school and 
completed the first course of post-compulsory school mathematics with the highest possible 
grades. 
Prior to the investigation reported below and in order to familiarise students with the study, 
the first author spent approximately 30 hours, over a period of four months, as a participant 
observer in their mathematics classroom. During this time he interacted with students as they 
solved problems. Through this students came to see him as a mathematical friend rather than 
a teacher and, importantly, came to trust him as an observer of how they solved their 
mathematical problems. At the end of this process, and in consultation with the teacher, six 
students, three boys and three girls, were invited to participate in the study reported here. 
Clinical interviews 
Students were invited to participate in individual clinical interviews, which have three 
primary purposes (Ginsburg, 1981). The first is the discovery of cognitive processes, the 
second the specification of those processes, which “is usually a complex inferential process” 
(Ginsburg, 1981, p. 6) and the third is the “evaluation of levels of competence”. Moreover, as 
in the study we report below, “the distinctions among these aims may be blurred, and more 
than one aim may be involved” (Ginsburg, 1981, p. 5). Such interviews typically begin with 
interviewees being invited to solve mathematical tasks in a think-aloud manner, being 
prompted to describe the steps taken and the reasons behind them. 
In this study, students were interviewed in a private room close to but separate from their 
ordinary classroom. First Problem 1 was posed and then, after a short break, Problem 2. 
During this time students were encouraged not only to write down as much as they could but 
also ‘think aloud’ whenever possible. When appropriate, the interviewer posed 
supplementary questions to facilitate the process and students were encouraged to take as 
much time as they felt was necessary. To minimise the participants’ influence on each other, 




all interviews were undertaken during a single day. No participant needed longer than 14 
minutes to solve either problem. Finally, at the end of the problem solving element of the 
interview students were asked to reflect on their two problem solving attempts. This was 
undertaken to allow, as far as is practicable, additional opportunities for students to articulate 
their mathematical thinking (Øystein, 2011). All students’ writings and utterances were 
captured by an electronic pen that makes digital records of both writing and speech. 
Data analysis 
Prior to data collection, the two tasks used in this study were piloted on a class of students 
different from that to which our six participants belonged. Analyses of their responses 
indicated the following. Firstly, as might be expected, Krutetskii’s general synthetic 
component or ‘mathematical cast of mind’ was unobservable in students’ problem-solving 
behaviours and excluded from the analysis. Of the remaining three broad abilities, the 
abilities to obtain mathematical information and retain mathematical information were 
defined as originally by Krutetskii. However, our view was that the ability to process 
mathematical information was better construed as two broad abilities. That is, we separated 
those elements focused on meta-cognitive or regulative abilities from those focused on the 
processes of mathematical generalisation, not least because Krutetskii himself saw the latter a 
key component of mathematical understanding, arguing that understanding depends on a 
“rapid and broad generalization of mathematical objects, relations and operations” 
(Krutetskii, 1976, p. 341). These four broad abilities can be seen below. 
 (O) The ability to obtain and formalize mathematical information 
e.g. the student is thinking of, draws or notes the structure of the problem or 
determines the relationship between the entities and the variables from the context of 
the problem 
(P) The ability to process mathematical information 
e.g. the student performs well-known methods for problem-solving by using logical, 
systematic and sequential thinking 
(G) The ability to generalize mathematical objects, relations and operations  
e.g. the student transforms numerical approaches into operations with conventional 
symbols and thereby obtains a general solution of the given problem 
(M) The ability to retain mathematical information, i.e. mathematical memory  
e.g. the student remembers a method for calculating the area of a geometric shape or 
recalls that a given task can be written as an equation or an inequality.  
As mentioned, the digital recording of the problem-solving activities resulted in an exact 
linear reproduction of the participants written solutions, drawings and verbal utterances. This 
was especially useful when performing qualitative content analysis of the empirical material, 
inspired by Graneheim and Lundman (2004) and van Leeuwen (2005). Each episode that 
lasted at least one second was scrutinised for evidence of those abilities that could be 
observed in the written solutions, drawings and verbal utterances. In this manner, some 
episodes were multiply-coded. 
RESULTS 
The clinical interviews revealed that students had not seen the problems previously and that 
the tasks, fulfilling one of the major requirements for the study, were non-routine and 
challenging. Taking a broad sweep of the data for each student’s problem-solving attempts, it 
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became apparent that each fell into three main phases, which occurred chronologically, that 
structure what follows. 
The orientation phase 
The first, the orientation phase, occurred at the start of the problem-solving activity and 
shows students exploiting abilities related to obtaining and formalising mathematical 
information as well as mathematical memory. By way of example, Table 1 shows the data for 
Heather’s orientation phase on Problem 1. 




0:00 sits quietly, doesn’t 
draw nor write 
anything 
from the interview 
I:              And what were you, what were you 
thinking about in the beginning? 
Heather:  Hum (...) how to calculate the area of these 
kinds of figures. 
I:              The perimeter. 
Heather:  Yes, the perimeter, I mean perimeter. Yes, 
if you could see any connection type. Yes, 
I needed one (...) common variable or just 
variable. 
O, M 
0:25  from the observation 
Heather:  Ah, this is the large one (…) and this 
length. Thus, this length, so it is (...) its 
perimeter. 
O 
0:48  from the observation 
Heather:  The perimeter is around the whole… 
O, M 
0:54  from the observation 
Heather:  Hum (…) okay. 
O, M 
1:22  from the observation 
Heather:  How is one supposed to calculate the 
perimeter? 
M 
1:30 d ∙ π  O, M 
Table 1: Heather’s orientation phase for Problem 1 
As can be seen, Heather began her solution attempt by saying and apparently doing nothing 
for 25 seconds. However, during her clinical interview she recalled that during this period she 
was thinking about how to calculate the perimeter of the semicircles. Thus, while the 
observational evidence appeared to yield little, her interview showed, in her thinking about 
the perimeter of circles and the procedure for calculating them, evidence of her obtaining (O) 
mathematical information and exploiting her mathematical memory (M). In the following 
episodes, which started at 0:25 and ended after 1:30, observational data showed her thinking 
aloud, albeit in a hesitant and initially unsure manner, about the mathematical relationships 
connecting the perimeter of a circle and its diameter. Finally, she wrote down the formula for 
the perimeter of a circle. As with the first episode, throughout these episodes she exhibited 




both the ability to identify information (O) and exploit mathematical memory (M). Like 
Heather, all students began their solution processes by reading the problem and thinking 
quietly for a while before writing or drawing something. Thus, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that this orientation phase may be a characteristic of able students; that is, they do not 
expect to start to solve a problem before they have obtained and formalised its embedded 
mathematical information and recalled what they believe are the appropriate methods. 
The processing phase 
The orientation phase was directly followed by a phase in which students processed the 
mathematical information formalised earlier. That is, they begin to undertake mathematical 
operations, think logically and apply mathematical reasoning. In this respect, the data in 
Table 2, showing Larry’s processing phase, exemplify this well with respect to Problem 2: 




1:22 Mary = x – 24 
Peter = x – 2 
Larry: The CD has a price and we can call that 
price x, we write the price of the CD (…) 
then Mary has (…) Oh, x minus 24. And 
then Peter has x minus 2. 
O 
1:42 (x – 24) + (x – 2) = 
2x – 26 = ? < x  
Larry: And x minus 24, oh, plus x minus 2, oh, it 
will not be x, but if, it might be. Hmm (...) 
it will be 2x minus 26 (…) 
Larry: And it will be (…) something less than x. I 




















25 – 25.99 
24 < x < 26 
Larry:       But, well, it feels as if Mary has 24 less 
and Peter has 2 less than the CD’s price 
and even if they put their money together 
(...) This means of course that Mary 
cannot have more than 2 SEK. Since she 
could not even add up with Peter’s (…) 
Hum (…) 2 SEK, then Mary has less than 
2 SEK. 
Larry:       Eh…Thus… the CD cost from 24 to 
maybe 25.99. It may cost between 24 
and... It may not cost 26… It must cost ... 
26 is greater than x, and x is greater than 
24. 
P 
Table 2: Larry’s processing phase at Problem 2 
As can be seen from Table 2, Larry engaged in considerable thinking out loud while 
processing information. In the first episode he formalised (O) the structure of the problem, by 
using x to represent the unknown, which in this case was the cost of the CD. In so doing his 
notation, Mary = x – 24, was mathematically poor but his comments indicated a clear 
understanding as to his mathematically correct intentions. This was followed (at 1:42) by his 
constructing an inequality by adding and then simplifying the two expressions. In this case, 
his oral comments showed a clear understanding of both his goal and his mathematical 
representation of the problem, which he was able to manipulate and simplify (P). Later, at 
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2:35, despite what seemed like uncertainty with respect to the formal solving of the 
inequality, he argued in a logical, systematic and sequential way to obtain an accurate 
solution (P). 
The checking phase 
The third phase was situated at the very end of the problem-solving activities, when students 
were observed to check their methods and solutions. In this respect, Table 3 shows how Linda 
checked her solution to the second problem. 




4:38  Linda: We know that it has to be possible to take 





Linda: She has in fact 1 SEK. 
                The price of the CD is 25 SEK. 
                Peter has 23 SEK. 
P 
5:24  Linda:      It is all right, 25 is less than 26. P 
Table 3: Linda’s checking of Problem 2 
As seen in Table 3 there is more evidence of Linda thinking aloud than of her writing. At 
4:38 she talks of the need, to account for Mary’s conditions, to be able to subtract 24 SEK 
from the cost of the CD. At 4:52 she then concludes, having already shown that x < 26, that 
Mary must have just one SEK and Peter, therefore, must have 23 because the cost of the CD 
must be at least 25 SEK. Throughout, she is articulating her mathematical reasoning (P), 
concluding that “it is all right, 25 is less than 26”. 
These three phases were observed in every problem-solving activity, leading us to conclude 
that: 
• Problem-solving activity typically begins with an orientation phase which engages 
both the ability to obtain and formalize mathematical information and mathematical 
memory. These abilities are intimately interrelated and, with the methods used in the 
present study, it is difficult to differentiate them. 
• Following the orientation phase is a processing phase during which students typically 
draw on the ability to process mathematical information. During this phase can often 
be observed logical thought, flexibility in mental processes, striving for clarity and 
simplicity of solutions, and the ability to curtail mathematical reasoning. 
• Every activity ends with a checking phase of processing mathematical information. At 
this stage, students check the appropriateness of their problem-solving methods and 
solutions by a re-actualisation of the problem context. 
What happens if the selected method does not lead to the desired outcome? 
In ten of the twelve cases, evidence indicated that when their first chosen method failed to 
lead directly to a solution, and despite evidence of personal stress, students typically returned 
to the orientation phase. That is, they began a second round of formalizing the mathematical 
information and using their mathematical memory, a phase that would then be followed by a 
new processing phase. Some participants went through this phase-shifting process three 
times. This was most evident with students’ solutions to the second problem, when four 
participants who used similar methods made the same mistake at the inequality 2x – 26 < x, 
as exemplified in the extract from Earl’s data presented in Table 4. 








4:47 x – 2 + x – 24 < x 
2x – 26 < x 
Earl:     Which means that x has to be less than 26. P 
5:55 x – 13 < x notes quietly P 
6:08 crosses out  
x – 13 < x 
notes quietly P 
Table 4: Earl’s attempt to solve 2x < 26 < x 
As seen in Table 4, during the episode beginning at 4:47, Earl correctly sums the two 
expressions to obtain the correct inequality. The recording of his thinking out loud also shows 
that he has interpreted the inequality correctly to assert that x, the cost of the CD, “has to be 
less than 26”. However, he then tried to divide the inequality by two and made a calculative 
error. After a few seconds he realised something was wrong and, although he said nothing, 
crossed out x – 13 < x.  
Importantly, perhaps reflecting an apparent insecurity, Earl returned to the orientation phase, 
as shown in Table 5. For the second time he extracted and formulated relevant information 
(O) and commented that he is trying to get “everything together in a more proper way”, 
confirming his confidence in his goal. He then processed this information (P) to construct 
exactly the same inequality he had earlier. Interestingly, his conclusion with respect the 
inequality came just 80 seconds after he had crossed out his previous attempt. 




7:28 x – 24 = Maria 
x – 2 = Peter 
x = CD price 
Earl:   I write, so I have everything together in a 
more proper way. 
O 
7:57 2x – 26 < x notes quietly P 
Table 5: Earl’s second orientation phase 
At this point, having realised that his new inequality was the same as his first, Earl became 
insecure once again and returned for a third orientation phase, as shown in Table 6. This 
time, we the same objective, he formulated the problem differently (O). In this case, drawing 
on the assumption that Maria had y SEK, he correctly concluded that Peter would have y + 
22. However, as can be seen at 10:10, when he began trying to process this formulation he 
made an error with the inequality sign. This led, although his processing of the incorrect 
inequality was mathematically correct, to the incorrect solution for y at the end of this 
episode. At this point he crossed out a second solution. Finally, having realised his mistake, 
he reversed the inequality but failed to understand its significance – that y, Maria’s sum, must 
be one SEK. At this point Earl became visibly anxious and stopped. After some seconds and 
additional contemplation, he understood the significance of y < 2 and completed the problem. 
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9:35 y + 22 = Peter 
y = Maria 
y + 24 = x 
notes quietly O 
10:10 y + 22 + y > y + 24 
2y + 22 > y + 24 
y > 2 
notes quietly P 
10:38 crosses out 
y > 2 
notes quietly  P 
10:44 y < 2 Earl:     I come back to the same inequalities... P 
Table 6: Earl’s third orientation phase 
As indicated earlier, four participants, drawing on similar approaches, construed 2x – 26 < x 
as being equivalent to x – 13 < x. In this context it is important to underline that every 
participant was familiar with solving inequalities. Thus, it is natural to wonder why high-
achieving students should consistently make such simple mistakes. In this respect the clinical 
interviews revealed that students became stressed their formalisation yielded an inequality 
rather than the expected equation. For example, Earl commented that “I was a little surprised 
when it was (…) an inequality to be solved”. Similar sentiments were expressed by, for 
example, Linda, who said that “I get so… When I start with equations ... then I really want to 
solve it with equations” and Heather, who observed that “I just didn’t know how to formulate 
it, right here... It is clear that it had been somewhat easier if there was a usual equation, I 
don’t know”. In this way the interviews indicated that the participants became insecure and 
disturbed mainly because they were not expecting to deal with inequalities after starting to 
solve the problem with equations. Thus, Sebastian’s comment that “this kind of tasks usually 
requires an equation” resonated closely with his peers’ perspectives. Interestingly, the 
analyses also revealed that even in the light of evidence that their strategies were working 
less well than expected, students persisted with the same orientation strategies.   
The absence of the ability to generalize mathematical objects, relations and operations 
As discussed earlier, Krutetskii (1976) highlighted a particular form of mathematical memory 
focused on generalised mathematical relationships. This we operationalised as the ability (G) 
to generalize mathematical objects, relations and operations  
e.g. the student transforms numerical approaches into operations with conventional 
symbols and thereby obtains a general solution of the given problem. 
Throughout the data of this particular ability was conspicuous in its absence, although there 
were three occasions, involving Erin, Sebastian and Larry, where students’ numerical 
approaches had the potential to result in such generalizations. In these circumstances, on 
completion of their numerical solutions, students were invited to generalize their results. An 
example of this can be seen in Table 7, which shows an excerpt from Erin’s solution of 
Problem 1.  
 








4:52 2.5 ∙ 3 = 7.5 
7.5/2 = 3.75 
notes quietly P 
5:37 
 
3.75 + 6.75 = 10.5 
 
Erin:       I get 10.5… so they have the same size, I 
believe… 
I:            It seems that they have the same size. 
Erin:       Yes. 
P 
5:48  I:              Do you think that this applies for all 
circles of this kind? 
Erin: Hum… maybe, I don’t know. I haven’t 
thought about that, if this applies for all 
circles… 
 









 I:              If we would change the proportions? If 
they were… If this short segment went 
there... Or if we move the point where the 
semi-circles are tangent to each other… 
Erin: Uh, yes, but I would, not because ... I do 
not really know how to say it. But I think 
that this is always true. I do not know how 
to prove it in some way if I have to use a 
general method. 
 
Table 7: Erin’s solution of Problem 1 
The data of Table 7 show that despite various invitations, Erin did not go on to generalize the 
results from her numerical solution. When asked, at 5:48, if she believed her solution would 
apply to all circles, she replied that she did not know. At 6:30, when she was offered 
additional hints with the aim of prompting a generalized solution, she confessed that she was 
unfamiliar with using general methods. In other words, she was unable to express the 
numerical relations between the diameters and semicircles in a generalized, abstract way. In 
short, the ability to generalize mathematical objects, relations and operations (G) could not be 
observed at the participants in the present study. 
DISCUSSION 
One of the main objectives of this study was to investigate the interaction of Krutetskii’s 
(1976) four key mathematical abilities during problem-solving. To achieve this, we employed 
an adaptation of those abilities and, following six high-achieving upper secondary students’ 
attempts to solve two unfamiliar problems, identified three phases of problem-solving 
activity. These were the orientation phase, where the ability to obtain and formalize 
mathematical information interacted with mathematical memory, the processing phase, where 
the formalized mathematical data were processed according to mathematical rules and 
principles, and a checking phase, in which further processing was undertaken. The evidence 
also showed that where students experienced failure, typically during their processing phases, 
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they invoked further phases of orientation. In these three phases can be seen clear resonance 
with earlier problem solving frameworks, such as, for example, Mason et al.’s (1982) entry, 
attack and review or Pólya’s (1957) four principles of problem solving. In this latter case, the 
first two of Pólya’s principles, understand the problem and devise a plan, were reflected in 
the orientation phase, while his carrying out the plan and reflecting and looking back 
matched closely the processing and checking phases. However, despite these clear 
resonances, which validate the analyses, the main contribution of this study lies in its 
highlighting how different forms of mathematical ability were invoked at different stages of 
the problem-solving process. A key aspect of this concerns what Krutetskii (1976) called the 
mathematical memory and the ability to generalise mathematical relations and operations. 
With respect to the mathematical memory, the data yielded little explicit evidence of its being 
invoked independently of other forms of ability, with only 5% of episodes exhibiting this 
ability on its own. More typically, as shown above, it was observed in conjunction with other 
abilities, usually the ability to obtain and formalize the mathematical information, during the 
orientation phase. In such instances it was observed in 12% of episodes. However, despite its 
relatively low rate of occurrence, the role of the mathematical memory seemed to play two 
pivotal roles in the ways these six students’ approached challenging, non-routine 
mathematical problems. Firstly, perhaps unsurprisingly, students selected their methods 
during the orientation phase. Secondly, having committed themselves to a particular method 
or approach during this first phase, they seemed to find it difficult to abandon or even modify 
their methods. Moreover, for some students, selecting ineffective methods led to stress, time 
delay and unexpected errors during problem-solving. That being said, while an inappropriate 
choice of method tended to create problems, the counter was also true. For example, with 
respect to the first problem, Linda, who was able to relate the problem to a generalized 
method involving well-defined and well-rehearsed procedures (the result of earlier 
generalizations), solved the problem in a most effective manner. 
These findings with respect to method selection allude to some important consequences. 
Firstly, students’ methods – chosen during the orientation phase at the start of the process – 
seem to be retained in working memory throughout the problem-solving process (Ingvar, 
2009; Nyberg et al., 2003). Secondly, the abilities manifested by these six students seemed 
closer to the nonflexible and conformist strategies of the high-achiever (Brandl, 2011) than 
the flexible and out-of-the-box-thinking of the mathematically gifted (Leikin, 2014). That is, 
throughout their problem-solving activity, students’ reasoning seemed more imitative than 
creative (Lithner, 2008), not least because their typical approaches to the first problem were 
numerical with little evidence of any generalised strategies, while their perspectives on the 
second were clouded by a failure to adapt an expected equation to the reality of an inequality. 
However, the relatively fast selection of problem-solving methods and the lack of flexibility 
when using them can also be explained by some basic functions of the human brain (e.g. 
Buckner & Wheeler, 2001; Ingvar, 2009; Nyberg et al., 2003; Shipp, 2007). For example, one 
of the brain’s functions is to assimilate new information in relation to previous experience; 
this means that the number of possible interpretations of a given problem decreases and the 
information-processing accelerates (Ingvar, 2009; Shipp, 2007). Thus, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that at the orientation phase, when searching for relevant information, participants 
were influenced by their previous experiences and acted in ways with which they were 
familiar – in the particular case of the second problem by drawing on their experiences that 
word-problems always yield equations. Another basic function of the human brain is to 
automate knowledge. While such automated processes are effective they tend to be inflexible, 
in that an automated process tends not to influence or be influenced by other working 
memory processes (Ingvar, 2009; Shipp, 2007). Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume 




that when their formalization of the second problem led to inequalities rather than the 
expected equations, students were unable to adapt their automated equation-solving 
procedures. 
In addition to the infrequent occurrence of the mathematical memory, the data yielded no 
evidence of the ability to generalize mathematical relations and operations. That is, not one 
participant, among those three who had the opportunity, was able to generalize their 
numerically-derived solutions. This is somehow surprising as the participants were extremely 
high-achievers and belonged to a group of students who, according to Krutetskii (1976), 
should be able to generalize numerical approaches. However, even though a proper 
investigation of the ability to generalize mathematical relationships or problem-solving 
methods was not the main focus of the present study, these findings might merit further 
discussion. Thus, it should be mentioned, that Krutetskii identified four levels of the ability to 
generalize, from the highest level, at which gifted students generalize “mathematical material 
correctly and immediately, “on the spot”” (Krutetskii, 1976, pp. 255) to the lowest, at which 
less able students cannot “generalize mathematical material according to essential features 
even with help from experimenter” (Krutetskii, 1976, p. 254). Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the ability of generalization of the three mentioned students was 
below the highest level during our study. 
Furthermore, earlier studies have shown that with appropriate interventions the ability to 
generalise develops over time (Sriraman, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). In particular, when 
they are offered, over a continuous period of several months and expected to solve 
individually and reflectively, a series of tasks focused on the same generality, talented 
students begin to engage in convergent thinking (Guilford, 1967). During this time they 
become able to discern “invariant principles or properties, as well as to formulate 
generalizations from seemingly different situations by focusing on structural properties 
during abstraction” (Tan & Sriraman, 2017, p. 118). In this manner, generalization can be 
regarded as an outcome of convergent thinking, which assembles structural similarities in 
ways that eliminates superficial similarities (Tan & Sriraman, 2017). Consequently, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the failure to generalize of the students reported here may be a 
consequence more of the procedures of the present study – only one problem and relatively 
little time for reflection – than their mathematical abilities. Moreover, acknowledging that the 
individual structure of mathematical abilities is dependent on and formed by the instruction 
students receive (Krutetskii, 1976), it is unlikely that our study’s participants would have 
experienced teaching from which convergent thinking and therefore the ability to generalize 
could have been developed (Sriraman, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Tan & Sriraman, 2017). 
Finally, the findings of this study confirm Krutetskii's (1976) observation that during the 
initial or orientation phase it is difficult to distinguish the ability to obtain and formalize 
mathematical information from the mathematical memory. According to the cognitive model, 
problem-solving involves parallel processes in the working memory and information-units 
from the working memory disappear after approximately 30 seconds – to counter that, one 
has to repeat and re-actualize the information in the working memory (e.g. Buckner & 
Wheeler, 2001; Nyberg et al., 2003; Olson et al., 2009). Consequently, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that mathematical problem-solving starts with parallel processes in the working 
memory and that the (in the present study identified) orientation phase is associated with the 
above mentioned abilities. However, since the information-units are retrieved at an extremely 
high speed to the working memory – often by automated processes – the methods used in this 
study were not sufficient to distinguish the information-units connected to respective abilities. 
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We end by concluding that the relationship between problem-solving competence and 
Krutetskii’s (1976) abilities, including the mathematical memory, remains complex and in 
need of further study. That said, the findings of this study highlight two important 
phenomena. Firstly, that the mathematical memory has a key function during the orientation 
phase of any problem solving. Secondly, unless students are inducted into flexible ways of 
managing prior experiences of mathematics or engaged in problem-solving activities which 
enable convergent thinking and thereby facilitate the discernment of generalizations (Tan & 
Sriraman, 2017), some students currently identified as high-achieving will fail to acquire the 
higher order abilities associated with mathematical giftedness (Leikin, 2014; Øystein, 2011; 
Usiskin, 2000). 
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